Abstract
The seeming distinction between motor and cognitive skills has hinged on the fact that the former are automatic and non-propositional (knowing-how), whereas the latter are slow and deliberative (knowing-that). Here, the physiological and behavioral phenomenon of long-latency stretch reflexes is used to show that “knowing-that” can be incorporated into “knowing-how,” either immediately or through learning. The experimental demonstration that slow computations can, with practice, be cached for fast retrieval, without the need for re-computation, dissolves the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist distinction: All complex human tasks, at any level of expertise, are a combination of intelligent reflexes and deliberative decisions.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 822-830 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Philosophical Psychology |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue number | 5 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2019 |
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Keywords
- automaticity
- knowing how
- knowing what
- Motor
- reflex
- skill
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Applied Psychology
- Philosophy
Cite this
The intelligent reflex. / Krakauer, John.
In: Philosophical Psychology, Vol. 32, No. 5, 01.01.2019, p. 822-830.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - The intelligent reflex
AU - Krakauer, John
PY - 2019/1/1
Y1 - 2019/1/1
N2 - The seeming distinction between motor and cognitive skills has hinged on the fact that the former are automatic and non-propositional (knowing-how), whereas the latter are slow and deliberative (knowing-that). Here, the physiological and behavioral phenomenon of long-latency stretch reflexes is used to show that “knowing-that” can be incorporated into “knowing-how,” either immediately or through learning. The experimental demonstration that slow computations can, with practice, be cached for fast retrieval, without the need for re-computation, dissolves the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist distinction: All complex human tasks, at any level of expertise, are a combination of intelligent reflexes and deliberative decisions.
AB - The seeming distinction between motor and cognitive skills has hinged on the fact that the former are automatic and non-propositional (knowing-how), whereas the latter are slow and deliberative (knowing-that). Here, the physiological and behavioral phenomenon of long-latency stretch reflexes is used to show that “knowing-that” can be incorporated into “knowing-how,” either immediately or through learning. The experimental demonstration that slow computations can, with practice, be cached for fast retrieval, without the need for re-computation, dissolves the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist distinction: All complex human tasks, at any level of expertise, are a combination of intelligent reflexes and deliberative decisions.
KW - automaticity
KW - knowing how
KW - knowing what
KW - Motor
KW - reflex
KW - skill
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85070650953&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85070650953&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1080/09515089.2019.1607281
DO - 10.1080/09515089.2019.1607281
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85070650953
VL - 32
SP - 822
EP - 830
JO - Philosophical Psychology
JF - Philosophical Psychology
SN - 0951-5089
IS - 5
ER -