Abstract
The seeming distinction between motor and cognitive skills has hinged on the fact that the former are automatic and non-propositional (knowing-how), whereas the latter are slow and deliberative (knowing-that). Here, the physiological and behavioral phenomenon of long-latency stretch reflexes is used to show that “knowing-that” can be incorporated into “knowing-how,” either immediately or through learning. The experimental demonstration that slow computations can, with practice, be cached for fast retrieval, without the need for re-computation, dissolves the intellectualist/anti-intellectualist distinction: All complex human tasks, at any level of expertise, are a combination of intelligent reflexes and deliberative decisions.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 822-830 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Philosophical Psychology |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 5 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jan 1 2019 |
Keywords
- automaticity
- knowing how
- knowing what
- Motor
- reflex
- skill
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Applied Psychology
- Philosophy