TY - JOUR
T1 - The decision to cover a procedure at HMOs
T2 - Who makes the call?
AU - Frick, Kevin D.
AU - Powe, Neil R.
PY - 1998
Y1 - 1998
N2 - A model is developed in which medical directors at health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have a most preferred level of responsibility for making decisions about coverage for new procedures. Responsibility that they do not have is shared by decision makers internal to and external to the HMO based on a combination of the medical director's preferences and constraints set by the HMO. Therefore, observations of the division of responsibility are expected to depend on preferences and constraints. We find that variation in constraints imposed by HMOs, but not variation in medical directors' preferences, influences the division of decision making authority between medical directors, others internal to the HMO, and decision makers external to the HMO.
AB - A model is developed in which medical directors at health maintenance organizations (HMOs) have a most preferred level of responsibility for making decisions about coverage for new procedures. Responsibility that they do not have is shared by decision makers internal to and external to the HMO based on a combination of the medical director's preferences and constraints set by the HMO. Therefore, observations of the division of responsibility are expected to depend on preferences and constraints. We find that variation in constraints imposed by HMOs, but not variation in medical directors' preferences, influences the division of decision making authority between medical directors, others internal to the HMO, and decision makers external to the HMO.
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U2 - 10.1016/s1053-5357(99)80105-x
DO - 10.1016/s1053-5357(99)80105-x
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0040685926
SN - 2214-8051
VL - 24
SP - 515
EP - 533
JO - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
JF - Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics
IS - 4
ER -