Safety strategies in an academic radiation oncology department and recommendations for action

Stephanie A Terezakis, Peter Pronovost, Kendra Harris, Theodore DeWeese, Eric Ford

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

Background: Safety initiatives in the United States continue to work on providing guidance as to how the average practitioner might make patients safer in the face of the complex process by which radiation therapy (RT), an essential treatment used in the management of many patients with cancer, is prepared and delivered. Quality control measures can uncover certain specific errors such as machine dose miscalibration or misalignments of the patient in the radiation treatment beam. However, they are less effective at uncovering less common errors that can occur anywhere along the treatment planning and delivery process, and even when the process is functioning as intended, errors still occur. Prioritizing Risks and Implementing Risk-Reduction Strategies: Activities undertaken at the radiation oncology department at the Johns Hopkins Hospital (Baltimore) include Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA), risk-reduction interventions, and voluntary error and nearmiss reporting systems. A visual process map portrayed 269 RT steps occurring among four subprocesses-including consult, simulation, treatment planning, and treatment delivery. Two FMEAs revealed 127 and 159 possible failure modes, respectively. Risk-reduction interventions for 15 "top-ranked" failure modes were implemented. Since the error and near-miss reporting system's implementation in the department in 2007, 253 events have been logged. However, the system may be insufficient for radiation oncology, for which a greater level of practice-specific information is required to fully understand each event. Conclusions: The "basic science" of radiation treatment has received considerable support and attention in developing novel therapies to benefit patients. The time has come to apply the same focus and resources to ensuring that patients safely receive the maximal benefits possible.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)291-299
Number of pages9
JournalJoint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety
Volume37
Issue number7
StatePublished - Jul 2011

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Radiation Oncology
Safety
Risk Reduction Behavior
Therapeutics
Radiotherapy
Radiation
Baltimore
Quality Control

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Leadership and Management

Cite this

Safety strategies in an academic radiation oncology department and recommendations for action. / Terezakis, Stephanie A; Pronovost, Peter; Harris, Kendra; DeWeese, Theodore; Ford, Eric.

In: Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety, Vol. 37, No. 7, 07.2011, p. 291-299.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Terezakis, Stephanie A ; Pronovost, Peter ; Harris, Kendra ; DeWeese, Theodore ; Ford, Eric. / Safety strategies in an academic radiation oncology department and recommendations for action. In: Joint Commission Journal on Quality and Patient Safety. 2011 ; Vol. 37, No. 7. pp. 291-299.
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