Information Hazards in Biotechnology

Gregory Lewis, Piers Millett, Anders Sandberg, Andrew Snyder-Beattie, Gigi Gronvall

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

With the advance of biotechnology, biological information, rather than biological materials, is increasingly the object of principal security concern. We argue that both in theory and in practice, existing security approaches in biology are poorly suited to manage hazardous biological information, and use the cases of Mousepox, H5N1 gain of function, and Botulinum toxin H to highlight these ongoing challenges. We suggest that mitigation of these hazards can be improved if one can: (1) anticipate hazard potential before scientific work is performed; (2) consider how much the new information would likely help both good and bad actors; and (3) aim to disclose information in the manner that maximally disadvantages bad actors versus good ones.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalRisk Analysis
DOIs
StateAccepted/In press - Jan 1 2018

Fingerprint

Infectious Ectromelia
Botulinum Toxins
Biotechnology
Hazards
Biological materials

Keywords

  • Biotechnology
  • dual-use research of concern
  • information hazards

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Physiology (medical)

Cite this

Lewis, G., Millett, P., Sandberg, A., Snyder-Beattie, A., & Gronvall, G. (Accepted/In press). Information Hazards in Biotechnology. Risk Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13235

Information Hazards in Biotechnology. / Lewis, Gregory; Millett, Piers; Sandberg, Anders; Snyder-Beattie, Andrew; Gronvall, Gigi.

In: Risk Analysis, 01.01.2018.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Lewis, G, Millett, P, Sandberg, A, Snyder-Beattie, A & Gronvall, G 2018, 'Information Hazards in Biotechnology', Risk Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13235
Lewis G, Millett P, Sandberg A, Snyder-Beattie A, Gronvall G. Information Hazards in Biotechnology. Risk Analysis. 2018 Jan 1. https://doi.org/10.1111/risa.13235
Lewis, Gregory ; Millett, Piers ; Sandberg, Anders ; Snyder-Beattie, Andrew ; Gronvall, Gigi. / Information Hazards in Biotechnology. In: Risk Analysis. 2018.
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