DRGs and Hospital Readmissions

Irwin Goldberg; Perry A. Lambird; Karen M. Magnuson; Peter Manu; Ronald B. Goodspeed; Gilbert S. Omenn; Douglas A. Conrad; Earl P. Steinberg; Gerard F. Anderson

doi:10.1056/NEJM198503213121219

DRGs and Hospital Readmissions

Irwin Goldberg, Perry A. Lambird, Karen M. Magnuson, Peter Manu, Ronald B. Goodspeed, Gilbert S. Omenn, Douglas A. Conrad, Earl P. Steinberg, Gerard F. Anderson

Bloomberg School of Public Health

Research output: Contribution to journal › Letter › peer-review

Abstract

To the Editor: There are three aspects of the Sounding Board article by Omenn and Conrad, “Implications of DRGs for Clinicians,” that require clarification (Nov. 15 issue).* The prospective payment system with its diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) is fundamentally a program of price or rate control. Although it is offered as a transitional step, it is counter to the administration's stated goal of introducing competition into the health care field. Predetermined set prices without regard to negotiation are regulatory mechanisms. First of all, it is only partially true that DRGs constitute a move to a cost-containment or deflation mechanism. It would.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	793-794
Number of pages	2
Journal	New England Journal of Medicine
Volume	312
Issue number	12
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1056/NEJM198503213121219
State	Published - Mar 21 1985

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Medicine(all)

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title = "DRGs and Hospital Readmissions",

abstract = "To the Editor: There are three aspects of the Sounding Board article by Omenn and Conrad, “Implications of DRGs for Clinicians,” that require clarification (Nov. 15 issue).* The prospective payment system with its diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) is fundamentally a program of price or rate control. Although it is offered as a transitional step, it is counter to the administration's stated goal of introducing competition into the health care field. Predetermined set prices without regard to negotiation are regulatory mechanisms. First of all, it is only partially true that DRGs constitute a move to a cost-containment or deflation mechanism. It would.",

author = "Irwin Goldberg and Lambird, {Perry A.} and Magnuson, {Karen M.} and Peter Manu and Goodspeed, {Ronald B.} and Omenn, {Gilbert S.} and Conrad, {Douglas A.} and Steinberg, {Earl P.} and Anderson, {Gerard F.}",

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T1 - DRGs and Hospital Readmissions

AU - Goldberg, Irwin

AU - Lambird, Perry A.

AU - Magnuson, Karen M.

AU - Manu, Peter

AU - Goodspeed, Ronald B.

AU - Omenn, Gilbert S.

AU - Conrad, Douglas A.

AU - Steinberg, Earl P.

AU - Anderson, Gerard F.

PY - 1985/3/21

Y1 - 1985/3/21

N2 - To the Editor: There are three aspects of the Sounding Board article by Omenn and Conrad, “Implications of DRGs for Clinicians,” that require clarification (Nov. 15 issue).* The prospective payment system with its diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) is fundamentally a program of price or rate control. Although it is offered as a transitional step, it is counter to the administration's stated goal of introducing competition into the health care field. Predetermined set prices without regard to negotiation are regulatory mechanisms. First of all, it is only partially true that DRGs constitute a move to a cost-containment or deflation mechanism. It would.

AB - To the Editor: There are three aspects of the Sounding Board article by Omenn and Conrad, “Implications of DRGs for Clinicians,” that require clarification (Nov. 15 issue).* The prospective payment system with its diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) is fundamentally a program of price or rate control. Although it is offered as a transitional step, it is counter to the administration's stated goal of introducing competition into the health care field. Predetermined set prices without regard to negotiation are regulatory mechanisms. First of all, it is only partially true that DRGs constitute a move to a cost-containment or deflation mechanism. It would.

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