COVID-19 and the gain of function debates: Improving biosafety measures requires a more precise definition of which experiments would raise safety concerns

Kelsey Lane Warmbrod; Michael G. Montague; Gigi Kwik Gronvall

doi:10.15252/embr.202153739

COVID-19 and the gain of function debates: Improving biosafety measures requires a more precise definition of which experiments would raise safety concerns

Kelsey Lane Warmbrod, Michael G. Montague, Gigi Kwik Gronvall

Bloomberg School of Public Health

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Original language	English (US)
Article number	e53739
Journal	EMBO Reports
Volume	22
Issue number	10
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.15252/embr.202153739
State	Published - Oct 5 2021

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Biochemistry
Molecular Biology
Genetics

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10.15252/embr.202153739

Cite this

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title = "COVID-19 and the gain of function debates: Improving biosafety measures requires a more precise definition of which experiments would raise safety concerns",

author = "Warmbrod, {Kelsey Lane} and Montague, {Michael G.} and Gronvall, {Gigi Kwik}",

note = "Funding Information: A couple years later, an unrelated series of biosafety and biosecurity incidents prompted another examination of GOF work. In 2014, researchers at the CDC had been accidentally exposed to anthrax, highly pathogenic influenza strains were accidentally sent by the CDC to clinical laboratories, the US Department of Defense accidentally shipped incompletely irradiated live anthrax spores to dozens of diagnostic laboratories, and an abandoned box in an NIH cold room was found to contain glass vials of smallpox samples, which should have been turned over to the WHO or destroyed decades earlier. These biosafety and biosecurity failures, though completely unrelated to influenza research, led the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy to issue a funding pause on GOF studies involving influenza, MERS, and SARS. It only applied to research with these three viruses that might result in enhanced pathogenicity and/or transmissibility in mammals via the respiratory route. This funding pause was in place until the Recommended Policy Guidance for Departmental Development of Review Mechanisms for Potential Pandemic Pathogen Care and Oversight (P3CO) policy was implemented in 2017 (Department of Health & Human Services, 2017 ). Currently, it applies only to research conducted at or funded by the US Department of Health and Human Services, which includes the NIH. ",

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COVID-19 and the gain of function debates: Improving biosafety measures requires a more precise definition of which experiments would raise safety concerns

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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