TY - JOUR
T1 - Biosecurity Implications for the Synthesis of Horsepox, an Orthopoxvirus
AU - Dieuliis, Diane
AU - Berger, Kavita
AU - Gronvall, Gigi
N1 - Funding Information:
We would like to thank Carissa Meyer and Danielle Fields from Gryphon Scientific for helpful discussions about the horsepox synthesis experiment. We thank Rocco Casa-grande, Charles Lutes, and Thomas Inglesby for reading the article and offering thoughtful suggestions. Some of the analysis was supported by a grant to Dr. Berger and supporting funds for Dr. DiEuliis by the US Air Force Academy Projects on Advanced Systems and Concepts in Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (Grant No. FA7000-17-1-0010). The views and conclusions herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, positions, or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of USAFA, the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US government.
Publisher Copyright:
© Copyright 2017, Mary Ann Liebert, Inc. 2017.
PY - 2017/11/1
Y1 - 2017/11/1
N2 - This article examines the biosecurity and biodefense implications resulting from the recent creation of horsepox virus, a noncirculating (extinct) species of orthopoxvirus. Here we examine the technical aspects of the horsepox virus synthesis and conclude that orthopox synthesis experiments currently remain technically challenging-and will continue to be so, even once this work is published in the scientific literature. This limits potential misuse by some types of nefarious actors. We also examine the implications of one stated purpose for the recreation of horsepox virus: the development of a smallpox vaccine. If the development is successful, it could take advantage of US government incentives for the priority FDA review of medical countermeasures (MCMs) against biosecurity threats. However, if this case leads to the determination that this incentive is counterproductive for security, the newly created priority review voucher program should be more clearly defined or limited based on need. Limiting the program could have costs that require further consideration, however, as general incentives for biodefense medical countermeasure development are required for MCMs to be available. Finally, while the recreation of horsepox virus was not technically trivial, nor was it cell-free, this experiment was a de facto demonstration of already-assumed scientific capabilities. The ability to recreate horsepox, or smallpox, will remain no matter what policy controls are put into place. It will be impossible to close off all avenues for nefarious misuse of gene synthesis, or misuse of biological materials more broadly. As a result, we advocate for the implementation of policy, regulations, and guidance that will make illicit recreation harder, more burdensome, more detectable, and, thus, more preventable without having sweeping negative consequences for the research enterprise. As part of our biosecurity efforts, we must also encourage and enable scientists to participate actively and to do all they can to safeguard their technical fields from irresponsible or illicit actions.
AB - This article examines the biosecurity and biodefense implications resulting from the recent creation of horsepox virus, a noncirculating (extinct) species of orthopoxvirus. Here we examine the technical aspects of the horsepox virus synthesis and conclude that orthopox synthesis experiments currently remain technically challenging-and will continue to be so, even once this work is published in the scientific literature. This limits potential misuse by some types of nefarious actors. We also examine the implications of one stated purpose for the recreation of horsepox virus: the development of a smallpox vaccine. If the development is successful, it could take advantage of US government incentives for the priority FDA review of medical countermeasures (MCMs) against biosecurity threats. However, if this case leads to the determination that this incentive is counterproductive for security, the newly created priority review voucher program should be more clearly defined or limited based on need. Limiting the program could have costs that require further consideration, however, as general incentives for biodefense medical countermeasure development are required for MCMs to be available. Finally, while the recreation of horsepox virus was not technically trivial, nor was it cell-free, this experiment was a de facto demonstration of already-assumed scientific capabilities. The ability to recreate horsepox, or smallpox, will remain no matter what policy controls are put into place. It will be impossible to close off all avenues for nefarious misuse of gene synthesis, or misuse of biological materials more broadly. As a result, we advocate for the implementation of policy, regulations, and guidance that will make illicit recreation harder, more burdensome, more detectable, and, thus, more preventable without having sweeping negative consequences for the research enterprise. As part of our biosecurity efforts, we must also encourage and enable scientists to participate actively and to do all they can to safeguard their technical fields from irresponsible or illicit actions.
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U2 - 10.1089/hs.2017.0081
DO - 10.1089/hs.2017.0081
M3 - Review article
C2 - 29091742
AN - SCOPUS:85038607770
SN - 2326-5094
VL - 15
SP - 629
EP - 637
JO - Health Security
JF - Health Security
IS - 6
ER -