Bayesian and frequentist models: Legitimate choices for different purposes of clinical research

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

Objective Bayesian and frequentist approaches to statistical modelling in epidemiology are often pitted against each other as if they represented diametrically opposing philosophies. However, both approaches have a role to play in clinical epidemiology and the evaluation of clinical practice. Methods Here I present an overview of the philosophical underpinnings of the Bayesian and frequentist approaches, showing that each model has its place depending on the philosophical and evaluative needs of the user. Results If the user's approach to a clinical problem places an emphasis on identifying causal relationships, a frequentist approach might be best suited. On the other hand, if the user takes an approach in which estimating a priori probabilities is appropriate, a Bayesian approach might be more appropriate. One could imagine both approaches used for the same study. Conclusions Bayesian and frequentist approaches are complementary tools in the clinical evaluator's toolkit.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1045-1047
Number of pages3
JournalJournal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice
Volume16
Issue number6
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 1 2010

Keywords

  • Bayesianism
  • causality
  • estimation
  • frequentism
  • modelling
  • probability
  • statistics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Health Policy
  • Public Health, Environmental and Occupational Health

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