An efficient employer strategy for dealing with adverse selection in multiple-plan offerings: An MSA example

Mark V. Pauly, Bradley J Herring

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This paper outlines a feasible employee premium contribution policy, which would reduce the inefficiency associated with adverse selection when a limited coverage insurance policy is offered alongside a more generous policy. The 'efficient premium contribution' is defined and is shown to lead to an efficient allocation across plans of persons who differ by risk, but it may also redistribute against higher risks. A simulation of the additional option of a catastrophic health plan (CHP) accompanied by a medical savings account (MSA) is presented. The efficiency gains from adding the MSA/catastrophic health insurance plan (CHP) option are positive but small, and the adverse consequences for high risks under an efficient employee premium are also small. Copyright (C) 2000 Elsevier Science B.V.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)513-528
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Health Economics
Volume19
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 2000
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

Medical Savings Accounts
Major Medical Insurance
Insurance Coverage
Health
Premium
Employers
Adverse selection
Savings
Employees

Keywords

  • Adverse selection
  • Insurance

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

An efficient employer strategy for dealing with adverse selection in multiple-plan offerings : An MSA example. / Pauly, Mark V.; Herring, Bradley J.

In: Journal of Health Economics, Vol. 19, No. 4, 07.2000, p. 513-528.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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